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Charles B. Craver*
INTRODUCTION
Thirty years ago, I wrote an article which dealt in part with
privacy questions arising in employment environments.' I
discussed the right of employers to search employees, their
possessions, and their lockers. I explored employer monitoring of
workers through direct supervisory observation and through the
use of closed-circuit television cameras. I also examined the
frequent administration of polygraph tests in employment settings.
It is difficult to comprehend the employment environment changes
and the technological developments that have occurred since the
publication of that article.
Since private employers are not formally constrained by
constitutional provisions due to the absence of state involvement, I
discussed the ways in which labor arbitrators treated alleged
privacy invasions under collective bargaining agreements. When I
published that article in 1977, 22.6% of nonagricultural workers
were labor union members. 2 This meant that almost one-quarter of
private sector employees enjoyed contractual protection against
disciplinary actions that did not constitute "just cause" or that were
based upon improper employer privacy invasions. Nonunion firms
often followed similar practices to discourage their own workers
from contemplating unionization. Over the past thirty years, the
union membership rate has declined from 22.6% to 7.8%. Over
ninety percent of private sector personnel no longer enjoy the
privacy protections afforded by collective bargaining relationships.
Under common law doctrines, they constitute "at-will" employees
who can be terminated by their employers at any time for good
Copyright 2006, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW.
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1. Charles B. Craver, The Inquisitorial Process in Private Employment, 63
Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1977).
2. See Michael Goldfield, The Decline of Organized Labor in the United
States 11, Tbl. 2 (1987).
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cause, bad cause, or no cause. 4 As a result, they must rely entirely
upon legislative and judicial doctrines to provide them with
protection against unreasonable employer activities.
Almost every contemporary employment setting provides
employees with access to e-mail and the Internet. These
developments allow workers to communicate with each other
electronically, and to reach-and be reached by-parties from
around the world. Employees can easily contact union organizers,
and outside organizers can communicate directly with them. To
what extent may firms limit such worker-to-worker or worker-to-
organizer communications?
Workers can easily access millions of Internet sites. While
most of these are benign, some are offensive to business firms
concerned about their public images. May employers restrict non-
business-related employee use of e-mail systems or limit their right
to access Internet sites company officials find offensive? How can
firms prevent the improper dissemination of trade secrets or other
confidential information through these electronic media? Workers
often wish to know whether they are being treated the same as
other similarly situated employees, so employees compare
compensation packages. May employers discipline individuals
who share such personal and confidential information with others?
Years ago, employers could ask job applicants and current
employees about their medical histories, and they could condition
employment upon the satisfactory completion of pre-hire medical
examinations. Although the Americans with Disabilities Act
restricts some of these intrusive measures, 5 employers may still
require individuals to submit to general medical examinations after
they have been offered employment. If they discover latent
conditions or genetic predispositions to possibly disabling
maladies, may they refuse to employ such persons? Can
employees use other methods to determine which job applicants
might be dishonest or may possess undesirable personality traits?
Once a majority of workers in appropriate bargaining units
select labor organizations to be their exclusive bargaining agents
under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), those unions
have the right to negotiate on the workers' behalf with respect to
wages, hours, and working conditions. When union officials need
confidential employer information to help them negotiate new
agreements or to administer existing contracts, they may generally
obtain access to that information. What if the employer declines to
4. See Mark A. Rothstein, Charles B. Craver, Elinor P. Schroeder & Elaine
W. Shoben, Employment Law Treatise 401-02 (3rd ed. 2004).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2000).
1058 [Vol. 66
2006] EMPLOYEES AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
provide them with the requested information because it would
divulge corporate secrets or would contravene the privacy rights of
employees or third parties such as customers who have complained
about poor employee service?
Privacy-related concerns arise regularly in employment
settings. Employers assert private property rights to restrict the
organizing activities of both employees and non-employee union
organizers. They also assert privacy claims when representative
labor organizations request access to confidential company
financial records or similarly privileged information. On the other
hand, employers frequently discount employee privacy claims
when they monitor worker activities through closed-circuit
television cameras and access to employee e-mail exchanges and
Internet activities. Firms similarly ignore worker privacy interests
when they conduct expansive pre-employment medical
examinations and administer tests that purport to measure applicant
honesty and other personality traits.
This article explores these interesting privacy issues in twenty-
first century employment settings. Part I considers employer
reliance upon privacy interests to restrict employee and union
organizing activities. To what extent may companies limit these
rights? Although representative unions possess the statutory right
to seek access to confidential firm data or private employee
information that is relevant to the negotiation of bargaining
agreements and the administration of those contracts, employers
often counter union requests with claims of confidentiality. When
are firm or employee privacy rights likely to outweigh labor
organization bargaining interests?
In Part II, we consider the degree to which employers may
disregard worker privacy interests when they wish to obtain
information of a confidential nature. How can managers visually
or electronically monitor worker job performance or their protected
concerted activities? When can companies access employee e-mail
exchanges or Internet activities? When may employers require job
applicants or current employees to submit to medical
examinations, answer personal medical questions, or take
polygraph or paper-and-pencil tests that purport to measure
individual honesty or personality traits?
I. EMPLOYER RELIANCE UPON ITS OWN PRIVACY INTERESTS
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),6
guarantees employees the right to form, join, and assist labor
6. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
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organizations; to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or
protection; and to select exclusive bargaining agents to negotiate
on their behalf with respect to wages, hours, and employment
conditions. 7 Unrepresented workers who contemplate unionization
must generally communicate with union organizers and among
themselves. Individuals supporting collectivization distribute
literature explaining the benefits of unionization, and they solicit
employee signatures on authorization cards empowering the named
labor organizations to bargain on their behalf. If a majority of
workers in appropriate units of employees who share communities
of interests execute authorization cards, the designated unions may
request voluntary recognition and exclusive bargaining rights from
the relevant employers. Employers generally reject such requests,
requiring the labor organizations to petition the National Labor
Relations Board ("Labor Board") for representation elections. 8
A. Traditional No-Solicitation and No-Distribution Restrictions
Employees may not spend their work days handing out union
literature or soliciting authorization card signatures. Employers
have the right to restrict these activities to enable workers to
perform their expected job tasks. The Labor Board and the courts
have sought to balance the reasonable expectations of employers
against the concerted activity rights of individuals expected to
fulfill their job duties. Firms may thus prohibit all employee
literature distribution and authorization card solicitation during
work time, but not during non-work time.9 To avoid litter
problems, companies may also limit non-work time literature
distribution to non-work areas of their facilities.
10
Retail stores are permitted to impose additional restrictions
banning all employee solicitation and literature distribution at anX
time in the selling areas to preclude interference with customers.
The interest stores have in maintaining beneficial relationships
7. Employees also have the right to refrain from these activities. The duty
to bargain is set forth in Section 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000).
8. See Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301,
95 S. Ct. 429 (1974) (acknowledging right of employers to reject union requests
for voluntary recognition where they have not independently verified union
claims of majority support).
9. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 65 S. Ct. 982
(1945).
10. See Stoddard-Quirk Mfgr. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962).
11. See Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1953); May
Dep't Stores Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 976 (1944), enforced, 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 725, 67 S. Ct. 72 (1946).
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with customers outweighs the right of workers to engage in
concerted activity during their non-work time in the areas open to
prospective buyers. Different considerations have been relied
upon to allow health care institutions to restrict non-work time
distribution and solicitation in areas of immediate patient care,
including areas in which such individuals receive treatment. 12 This
privileged extension of the no-solicitation and no-distribution rules
is based upon the privacy interests of patients who might be
adversely affected by workers organizing activities in patient care
areas. When retail stores and health care providers take advantage
of their right to establish privileged no-solicitation and no-
distribution rules to protect customer relationships or patient
privacy, they must comply with their own privileged rules. If they
fail to do so, the Labor Board generally finds it impermissible to
enforce such privileged prohibitions against employees while the
employers ignore their own rules and undermine their professed
need for such special rules. 13
Must employers that establish conventional rules banning
employee solicitation and distribution during work time comply
with their own rules and refrain from anti-union proselytizing
during these same periods? Since the workers are on company
premises and are being paid to do what their employers tell them to
do, it is permissible for firms to contravene their own employee
rules and engage in their own solicitation during work time.14
Only where there is a significant imbalance in communication
opportunities by workers might employers who proselytize during
work time be required to open other communication channels to
their employees.
Employers may also call workers together in massed
assemblages during work time and make "captive audience"
speeches expressing their anti-union sentiments. The workers
must listen to these presentations, and firms are not obliged to
allow union supporters to respond unless they have overly broad
no-solicitation or no-distribution rules that unfairly.---and
unlawfully---create significant communication imbalances." The
Labor Board may similarly require employers to provide union
supporters with additional communication opportunities when they
12. See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 99 S. Ct. 2598 (1979).
Employees may thus be limited to distribution and solicitation during their non-
work time in other areas of health care facilities.
13. See Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 905, 73 S. Ct. 644 (1953).
14. See NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America, 357 U.S. 357, 78 S. Ct.
1268 (1958).
15. See Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
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engage in anti-union activities during work time. This is true
particularly in facilities in which employers have established
privileged no-solicitation and no-distribution rules pertaining to
selling areas of retail stores or patient care areas of health care
facilities, even when the employer activities take place away from
the selling areas or patient care locations, based upon the
communication imbalances created by these extra broad rules.'
6
When non-employee union organizers attempt to contact
employees at work, companies assert private property interests to
limit their access. In NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,17 the
Supreme Court acknowledged the sacrosanct nature of private
property rights when it severely limited the ability of non-
employee organizers to obtain access to employer premises. The
private property interests of firms would only have to yield to the
Section 7 collective action rights of workers where there were no
external communication channels through which organizers could
contact target employees. Since union organizers can use external
organizational meetings, home visits, telephone calls, and direct
mailings to reach most workers, rarely do the concerted rights of
employees outweigh the private property rights of employers.
In Jean Country,'8 the Labor Board recognized that the
traditional Babcock & Wilcox approach, which was developed for
private production facilities not open to the general public, should
not be automatically extended to retail establishments open to
prospective customers. The Board thus decided to establish a
three-part balancing test:
[I]n all access cases our essential concern will be [1] the
degree of impairment of the § 7 right if access should be
denied, as it balances against [2] the degree of impairment
of the private property right if access should be granted.
We view the consideration of [3] the availability of
reasonably effective alternative means [of communication]
as especially significant in this balancing process. 19
Under Jean Country, the Board would first balance the asserted
private property interests of the employer against the significance
16. See May Dep't Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 797 (1962), overruled by, 316
F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963). The Sixth Circuit Court declined to enforce the
Board's decision in this case, because it found that the Board had failed to
articulate the specific basis for its conclusion that a significant communication
imbalance had been created by the stores retail area ban.
17. 351 U.S. 105, 76 S. Ct. 679 (1956).
18. 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988), abrogated by, Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502
U.S. 527, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
19. Id. at 14.
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of the Section 7 right sought to be advanced by union organizers.
Where such areas as store parking lots were open to the general
public and fundamental organizing efforts were involved, the
balance would favor limited non-employee organizer access to
parking lot premises-despite the fact there might be external
communication channels through which union agents could contact
target employees. The Labor Board believed that businesses that
had public parking lots did not have the same privacy interests as
firms that did not allow non-company personnel to enter their
premises.
The Labor Board's Jean Country decision constituted a modest
modification of the traditional Babcock & Wilcox test and
reasonably reflected the transformation of the American economy
from mass production to retail and service. It also recognized the
critical fact that the premises firms sought to protect involved
parking lots open to the general public. Despite the fact this
statutory interpretation seemed to constitute a reasonable
interpretation of Section 7, a conservative Supreme Court majority
decided not to provide the Labor Board with the traditional judicial
deference given to administrative agencies. In Lechmere, Inc. v.
NLRB, E1 the Court held that the Labor Board was not authorized to
alter the standard it had previously articulated in Babcock &
Wilcox. The Justices implicitly recognized that the limited private
property rights associated with parking lots open to the general
public outweighed the statutorily protected organizational rights of
employees.
B. Employer Restrictions on Other Forms of Employee
Communication
Businesses cite privacy concerns to limit other forms of
employee-to-employee communication. They frequently try to
prevent workers from exchanging organizing messages with
coworkers or outside organizers via e-mail systems or through
Internet sites. They maintain that these restrictions are necessary
to preserve the privacy of employer-provided computers. If they
limit the use of e-mail and Internet access to firm business, they
would probably be safe. On the other hand, if they allow workers
to use e-mail systems for personal use-such as communicating
with friends and family members--they may not discriminatorily
preclude employee communications with other workers or union
20. See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct.
2778 (1984).
21. 502 U.S. 527, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
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organizers pertaining to concerted activities. 22 Nonetheless, a
number of employees have told me they are forbidden by their
employers to use company e-mail systems to communicate with
each other or with outside organizations concerning union issues.
Some labor unions have begun to appreciate the organizing
potential represented by e-mail transmissions and Internet sites.
They can use mass mailings to reach all of the employees of target
firms, and they can encourage the workers at those companies to
communicate among themselves with respect to union organizing
issues. They can establish Internet sites that explain the legal
rights of employees and the potential benefits of union
representation. If firms allow employees access to Internet sites
for personal reasons, they cannot forbid them access to union-
established sites. Such discriminatory policies would contravene
the NLRA.
Businesses also cite privacy interests to limit employee
discussions of other issues that do not directly involve
organizational activities. For example, many prohibit workers
from sharing information pertaining to compensation levels, and
they discipline employees who discuss such "confidential"
information. The Labor Board has recognized that workers have
the statutorily protected ight to exchange such information for
mutual aid and protection. Workers may understandably wish to
be sure they are being treated fairly compared to their similarly
situated colleagues, and they may ask each other about their
respective salaries and pay increases.
Employees may also be concerned about possible
discrimination prohibited by state and federal civil rights laws.
Employers that fail to provide female employees with
compensation equal to that paid to male employees performing
22. See United Services Automobile Ass'n, 340 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (2003);
Electronic Data Systems Corp., 331 N.L.R.B. 343 (2000). See generally Martin
Malin & Henry Perritt, The National Labor Relations Act in Cyberspace: Union
Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1 (2000).
23. See generally Arthur B. Shostak, Cyber Union: Empowering Labor
Through Computer Technology (1999).
24. See Waco, Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. 746 (1984) and Blue Cross-Blue Shield
of Ala., 225 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1976) (compensation discussions); Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc. 278 N.L.R.B. 622 (1986) (pay increase discussions).
25. Employees have the statutory right to discuss with fellow workers
complaints about managers and employer efforts to restrict such behavior may
similarly contravene the NLRA. See, e.g., KSL Claremont Resort, Inc., 344
N.L.R.B. No. 105 (2005).
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substantially equal work would violate the Equal Pay Act.26
Intentional pay differentials based upon race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin would also contravene Section 703 of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.27 Businesses may not rely upon
alleged privacy interests to prevent employees from ascertaining
whether they are being discriminatorily underpaid.
Section 704(a) of Title VII28 makes it unlawful for employers
to discriminate against individuals who oppose what they
reasonably think may be discriminatory employment practices. If
workers are disciplined because they share private compensation
information with each other to be sure they are not being treated
discriminatorily, they would probably enjoy protection under that
provision. Similar protection would probably be available under
Section 15(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)2 9 for
workers who exchange information to see if they are being denied
equal pay for equal work in violation of the Equal Pay Act portion
of the FLSA. Although that provision is expressly limited to
discrimination against individuals who have filed charges or
participated in enforcement proceedings, most courts have
appropriately held that protection should be afforded to persons
who have not engaged in such formal actions but who have
otherwise 3protested what they thought were Equal Pay Act
violations.
C. Employer Compliance with Union Requests for Company
Information
When a majority of employees in appropriate units select
exclusive bargaining agents, those unions are authorized to
negotiate on their behalf with respect to their wages, hours, and
working conditions. Once collective contracts have been achieved,
those representatives have the right to process grievances that
question the manner in which employers have applied particular
contractual provisions. During both the general collective
26. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000). The statute permits differentials based upon
seniority, merit, systems measuring earnings by the quantity or quality of
production, or any factor other than sex.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). See Washington County v. Gunther, 452
U.S. 161, 101 S. Ct. 2242 (1981) (sex); Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 106
S. Ct. 3000 (1986) (race).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
30. See Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1116, 120 S. Ct. 936 (2000); Valerio v. Putnam Associates,
Inc., 173 F.3d 35 (lst Cir. 1999).
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bargaining process and the contract administration process, union
representatives frequently request access to information possessed
by corporate officials. The failure to comply with requests for
such information may contravene Section 8(a)(5), 3 1 constituting
breaches of the duty to bargain in good faith.
Employers regularly object to union requests for company
records on the ground that they pertain to information of a private
nature. During the actual bargaining process, firms must provide
data relating to wages, job classifications, hours, and working
conditions to enable representative unions to decide what to
discuss. 32  Although they generally do not have to disclose
confidential financial records, if company bargainers use an
inability-to-pay assertion to counter union demands for wage or
benefit increases, they may be obliged to comply with union
requests for sufficient disclosure to support these financial
incapacity claims:
Good-faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims
made by either bargainer should be honest claims. This is
true about an asserted inability to pay an increase in wages.
If such an argument is important enough to present in the
give and take of bargaining, it is important enough to
require some sort of proof of its accuracy. And it would
certainly not be farfetched for a trier of fact to reach the
conclusion that bargaining lacks good faith when an
employer mechanically repeats a claim of inability to pay
without making the slightest effort to substantiate the
claim."
During the life of existing agreements, union representatives
may request company information to enable them to decide
whether and how to process employee grievances. 34 Although they
may not have to provide this information in the exact form
requested, they do have to give the union sufficient information to
satisfy their representational needs.3 5 If significant confidentiality
31. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).
32. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 76 S. Ct. 753 (1956). See
generally Florian Bartosic & Roger Hartley, The Employer's Duty to Supply
Information to the Union-A Study of the Interplay of Administrative and
Judicial Rationalization, 58 Cornell L. Rev. 23 (1972).
33. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. at 152-53, 76 S. Ct. at 755-56.
34. See NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436, 87 S. Ct. 565, 568
(1967).
35. See, e.g., Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Local Union No. 6-418 v.
NLRB, 711 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1983); H.M.S. Machine Works, 284 N.L.R.B.
1482 (1987).
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issues are involved, employers may demand that union
representatives execute appropriate confidentiality pledges.36
On other occasions, firms resist union requests for information
based upon other privacy considerations. For example, Detroit
Edison Co. v. NLRB, involved an employer that used
psychological aptitude tests to determine individual job
capabilities. After workers filed grievances challenging certain
promotional decisions, the union sought both the test questions and
answers and the test scores of individual employees. Detroit
Edison refused to disclose the test questions and answers except to
a qualified psychologist who would be ethically obligated to
preserve their confidentiality. Since this approach would have
provided the union with the information it needed while also
protecting reasonable company interests, this was found to
constitute an appropriate response to the union's request.38 The
company also refused to release the test scores of individual
employees without their express consent to preserve their privacy
expectations and the Court found this condition to be
3Y9appropriate. It is interesting to note that while Detroit Edison did
not hesitate to administer psychological tests that invaded the
individual privacy interests of its employees, it relied upon the
same employee privacy interests to restrict union access to the
resulting test scores.
If employers are able to establish other substantial concerns
with respect to union requests for confidential information,
company refusals to disclose such information may be excused.
For example, if firms have been using confidential informants to
discover unlawful worker drug usage, they may refuse to divulge
the identities of the undercover operatives.40 The need for
employers to protect the identities of their informants outweighs
the union desire to obtain that information. Similarly, when labor
organizations seek the names of individuals employed as strider
replacements during labor disputes, employers can refuse to supply
that information if they reasonably fear for the safety of the
replacement personnel.4
36. See, e.g., Hercules, Inc. v. NLRB, 833 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1987).
37. 440 U.S. 301, 99 S. Ct. 1123 (1979).
38. See id. at 315-16, 99 S. Ct. at 1131-32.
39. See id. at 317-20, 99 S. Ct. at 1132-34.
40. See Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 301 N.L.R.B. 1104 (1991).
41. See Chicago Tribune Co. v. NLRB, 965 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1992).
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II. EMPLOYER DISCOUNTING OF WORKER PRIVACY INTERESTS
A. Monitoring Employee Work, E-Mail Communications, and
Internet Activities
Company managers have the right to watch regular employees
to be sure they are performing their assigned job tasks and are not
engaging in impermissible conduct during their work time. On the
other hand, if managers engage in surveillance of protected
concerted activities during the non-work time of employees, their
employers will be subject to unfair labor practice liability.42 Firms
will similarly be found in violation of the NLRA if they induce or
encourage rank-and-file employees to spy upon the protected
activities of their coworkers.
Businesses appreciate the fact that supervisors cannot
personally monitor the activities of their workers at all times, and
they often use electronic devices to facilitate this process. Many
companies have installed closed-circuit television cameras to
enable managers to observe different areas simultaneously. These
may cover work areas and non-work areas that are open to public
scrutiny such as general production and service spaces, corridors,
and parking lots. Since employees do not have any reasonable
expectation of privacy while they are working or walking in these
public areas, these monitoring activities do not contravene their
basic rights. Only when such cameras are surreptitiously placed in
areas like locker rooms or lavatories without employee notification
are courts likely to find impermissible invasions of individual
privacy interests. In addition, if cameras or microphones are used
to spy upon the protected organizational activities of employees
during their non-work time, unfair practice liability is likely to
attach."3
When firms use cameras to monitor open areas of their
facilities, they should notify workers of the fact that they are
subject to electronic observation. Such disclosures would be
unlikely to undermine company use of this practice to keep track
42. See, e.g., Party Lite Worldwide, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. No. 155 (2005).
43. See Timkin Co. v. NLRB, 171 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3215 (6th Cir. 2002).
Actual surveillance of protected conduct will violate Section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1) (2000), even if the targets are unaware of the spying. See NLRB v.
Grower-Shipper Vegetable Ass'n of Cent. Cal., 122 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1941).
Where employers have not actually spied upon protected activities, unfair labor
practice liability may still be imposed if they give the workers the impression
their actions have been monitored. See Idaho Egg Producers, 111 N.L.R.B. 93
(1955), enforced, 229 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1956).
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of personnel work habits and to look for rule violations.
Furthermore, these disclosures would serve two important
functions. First, they would minimize the possibility of privacy
invasion claims, because workers would know that they are subject
to monitoring in open areas. Second, such notices would deter
misconduct such as theft or use of contraband by individuals who
would recognize that such actions could be electronically recorded.
Software programs make it easy for businesses to monitor
every keystroke made by employees on their computers. 44 Despite
the fact that most employees think they enjoy certain privacy
protections when they are at work, they do not.45  As a result,
companies can lawfully keep track of everything they type on their
computers. To avoid the aberrational court decision extending
privacy rights to individuals typing on their computers, employers
would be wise to notify personnel of the fact their keystrokes may
be monitored.
Although most people believe that employers do not have the
right to monitor worker phone calls,46 many companies monitor
telephone calls made by employees or use hidden microphones to
listen to oral conversations involving their workers.47 If they use
either of these practices to spy upon the statutorily protected
organizing activities of these individuals, they would be in
violation of the NLRA. They may face additional liability under
other federal and state laws. Title I of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act makes it illegal for third parties to
intercept or disclose the telephonic or oral communications made
48by other persons. Such interceptions are not covered, however, if
one of the parties to the telephonic or oral conversation has
consented to the interceptions49 or if the monitoring firms maintain
the communication systems and the monitoring is carried out in
"the normal course of [business]." 50  Furthermore, oral
communications are not protected when they include statements
uttered by persons who have no reasonable expectation that their
conversations will not be overheard or intercepted by others. 5 1 As
a result, if employers notify workers that microphones will be used
44. See Richard S. Rosenberg, The Technological Assault on Ethics in the
Modem Workplace in The Ethics of Human Resources and Industrial Relations
141, 148 (John W. Budd & James G. Scoville eds., 2005).
45. See id.
46. See id. at 145.
47. See id. at 146.
48. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2000).
49. See id. § 2511(2)(d).
50. See id. § 2511(2)(a)(i).
51. See id. § 2510(2).
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to monitor employee communications in work areas, Title II
would probably not apply to those activities. Most states have
laws restricting the secret monitoring of telephonic and oral
communications. 52 Some are similar to the prohibitions set forth in
the Omnibus Crime Control Act, while others provide more
expansive privacy protections. Employers that violate these laws
may be subject to significant monetary consequences.
More significant legal issues are likely to arise when firms
monitor e-mail exchanges and Internet access. If the evidence
were to suggest that employers have entered these systems to look
for employee organizing activities, there would be clear violations
of the NLRA-unless the companies prohibited employee use of
these systems for all non-business related purposes. The Labor
Board would not require direct proof of such an impermissible
motivation, because managers would rarely confess to such
considerations. The impermissible purpose would usually be
inferred from such factors as the initiation of monitoring activity
shortly after union organizing campaigns have commenced. The
monetary cost to firms engaged in unlawful surveillance of
protected activities would be minimal, however. The only remedy
under the NLRA would be a cease and desist order. The only cost
to the employers would involve the attorney fees incurred in
defense of their unfair labor practice activities.
The greater monetary risk to employers from access to e-mail
and Internet activities of employees would involve claims of
tortious privacy invasions. Most courts have held that workers do
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when they use
computers provided by their employers.53 Firms could further
minimize this problem by explicitly notifying workers that their e-
mail transmissions and Internet accessing are subject to company
monitoring. Managers should promulgate rules explaining which
activities are improper and subject to discipline. For example, use
of e-mail communications to sexually harass coworkers, to solicit
sex with others, or to reveal corporate secrets could reasonably be
proscribed. Any mention to outside parties of trade secrets or
confidential client information would subject the communicators to
discharge.
Company monitoring policies should explicitly preclude the
imposition of discipline upon employees who engage in statutorily
protected activities. For example, if e-mail systems may be used
for non-business-related purposes, no individuals should be
52. See Mark A. Rothstein, Charles B. Craver, Elinor P. Schroeder & Elaine
W. Shoben, Employment Law Treatise § 5.5 (3d ed. 2004).
53. See id. § 5.6.
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punished for communicating with coworkers or outsiders about
union organizing. Since firms may lawfully limit worker
discussions of union issues to non-work time, they could do the
same thing with respect to e-mail communications-so long as all
non-business use is restricted to non-work times such as coffee or
meal breaks. Since firms tend to be lax in enforcing such
limitations and allow workers to send personal e-mails during their
work time, they could not discriminatorily deny them the same
privilege with respect to union organizing exchanges.
Firms monitoring employee Internet access must follow similar
procedures. Workers should be expressly notified by company
officials that their Internet activities are subject to management
scrutiny. Appropriate use policies should be articulated to indicate
what behavior will not be tolerated. Disciplinary action should be
reserved to clearly improper conduct. If employees are permitted
to enter non-business-related Internet sites, they have the right to
go into union organizing sites. If they are punished for doing so,
unfair labor practice liability would result.
B. Medical and Personal Capability Testing
Similar legal issues could arise when corporations administer
pre-employment medical examinations or other tests designed to
determine applicant fitness. The Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) limits the degree to which firms may expose workers to
mandatory medical examinations or require them to answer general
medical questions. Despite these statutory restrictions--and the
obvious invasion of individual privacy involved--many companies
still endeavor to obtain such information.
Section 12112(d)(2) of the ADA.54 explicitly bans pre-
employment medical examinations and medical inquiries subject to
limited exceptions. Employers may describe the job tasks to be
performed and ask each applicant about their ability to perform
those tasks.55 Once offers of employment have been extended,
firms may require new hires to undergo general medical
examinations-so long as strict protections are followed. All new
workers must be subject to such exams, and the information
obtained must be kept in separate and confidential medical files.
Managers may only be informed of specific conditions that may
necessitate special job restrictions, and first aid personnel may be
told of conditions that may require emergency treatment. In no
case may the results of such general tests or inquiries be used to
54. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2) (2000).
55. See id. § 12112(d)(2)(B).
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discriminate against otherwise qualified individuals with
disabilities who could perform the essential job functions with or
without reasonable accommodations that could be provided by
employers without undue hardship.
56
Once individuals have begun to work for firms, they may not
be subjected to mandatory medical exams of a general nature.57
Employers may only conduct medical tests or ask medical
inquiries that are job-related and consistent with business
necessity. This means that they must restrict their medical
examinations to matters that directly relate to the ability of workers
to perform their particular job functions proficiently and safely.
Nonetheless, the ADA. does have an exception for drug tests
pertaining to unlawful drug usage.58
Now that medical specialists have developed tests to examine
the human genome, employers have the capacity during general
medical examinations to look for genetic predispositions to
conditions that might someday affect particular individuals.59 If
firms refused to hire these persons--or used such information from
subsequent drug tests to terminate current employees-would it
violate the ADA? These individuals would not be presently
disabled, because they would not have a medical condition that
substantially limits a major life activity, nor would they have "a
record of such impairment." 60  They could argue that their
employers "regard them" as being disabled-as demonstrated by
their refusal to hire them or to continue them in employment.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has held that people are only
"regarded as" disabled within the meaning of the ADA if
employers think they have conditions which, if they actually had
them, would substantially limit major life activities; or they have
non-disabling conditions employers erroneously believe are
substantially limiting. The mere fact that persons have
predispositions to possible future conditions would most likely not
fall within either prong of this narrow "regarded as" definition.
Courts should acknowledge that the severe limitations imposed
on pre- and post-employment medical tests demonstrate a
56. See id. § 12112(b).
57. See id. § 12112(d)(4).
58. See id. § 12114(d).
59. See Paul Steven Miller, Is There a Pink Slip in My Genes? Genetic
Discrimination in the Workplace, 3 J. Health Care L. & Pol'y 225 (2000).
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
61. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,489, 119 S. Ct. 2139,
2149-50 (1999). See generally Charles B. Craver, The Judicial Disabling of the
Employment Discrimination Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
18 Lab. Law. 417 (2003).
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congressional desire to preclude the use of such information to
disadvantage workers based upon unfair employer beliefs. The
results of pre-employment examinations must be kept in separate
and confidential files and many not be used to discriminate against
disabled individuals. Mandating tests of present employees must
be limited to job-related conditions 62 or efforts to discover
employee use of proscribed drugs.6 3  These narrow exceptions
would suggest that Congress did not intend to allow employers to
use information obtained from such pre- or post-employment
medical tests to deprive qualified people of job opportunities.
Although many employers previously subjected job applicants
to polygraph exams, this practice was prohibited by the Employee
Polygraph Protection Act of 19 88 .64 Polylraph exams may now be
required only in exceptional situations. 5  Some firms try to
circumvent this restriction through the use of paper and pencil tests
that purportedly measure test-taker honesty. Companies often
employ other paper and pencil tests to measure verbal and math
skills, applicant knowledge about their areas of specialization, or
personality traits. Even though these practices invade the privacy
interests of those being required to participate, employers do not
seem concerned about this issue. Since applicants who do not wish
to take such tests can simply look for work elsewhere, courts
would be unlikely to find that these testing practices violate basic
privacy rights.
The use of pre-employment screening mechanisms may
contravene Title VII. If such factors disproportionately disqualify
applicants by race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, adversely
affected persons could challenge them under the disparate impact
proof construct set forth in Section 703(k)(1)(A). 66  Once a
disparate impact is established--often using the four-fifths rule
under which the pass rate for the disadvantaged group is less than
four-fifths the pass rate for the preferred group"--the burden of
proof shifts to the employer to show that the challenged factor is
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B).
63. See id. § 12114(d).
64. See 29 U.S.C. § 2001-2009 (2000).
65. See id. § 2006(d)-(f). These exceptions pertain to on-going
investigations of theft, embezzlement, misappropriation, or industrial espionage
or sabotage where the suspected employee had access to the property in question
and the employer can articulate a reasonable suspicion of that person's
involvement (d), firms providing security services pertaining to the production
or transmission of electric or nuclear power (e), or firms authorized to
manufacture or distribute controlled substances (f).
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
67. See Part H of Uniform Guidelines of Employee Selection Procedures, 43
Fed. Ref. 38290 (1978).
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reasonably related to successful job performance. Companies
usually have experts establish statistically significant correlations
between the challenged criteria and job performance. If they are
unable to accomplish this, they must eliminate those factors. Even
if they can establish reasonable correlations, the claimants can still
prevail if they can demonstrate the availability of equally
predictive criteria having a less discriminatory impact.
A similar proof construct is applicable to disabled individuals
under the ADA if they can demonstrate either that they were not
given a fair opportunity to demonstrate their true capabilities 68 or
that the challenged factors have a disproportionate impact upon
disabled people, unless the employer can show that the factors are
reasonably predictive of job performance.6 9 The Supreme Court
recently held that the same disparate impact proof construct is
available under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act7 ° with
respect to hiring criteria that disproportionately disqualify
applicants who are forty years of age or older.71 In the same
decision, however, the Court indicated that if employers can
articulate rational bases for using such tests, they will be exempt
from liability under the provision allowing employers to make
differentiations among candidates that are "based on reasonable
factors other than age .. ,72 It would thus be difficult for older
workers to successfully challenge facially-neutral practices that
disproportionately disqualify older applicants, so long as those
criteria appear to be based on reasonable factors other than age.
When the disparate impact proof construct was initially
recognized in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,73 the Court indicated that
employers could only sustain factors causing a disproportionate
impact upon protected groups if they could establish that those
factors were job-related. The Justices stated that the "touchstone is
business necessity," with firms being required to show that
challenged criteria "have a manifest relationship to the
employment in question."74 When Congress codified this standard
in the 1991 Civil Rights Act amendments to Title VII, it used the
identical "business necessity" language.75 Nonetheless, lower
courts have not applied this standard literally, because judges
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(7).
69. See id. § 12112(b)(6) (2000).
70. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a).
71. See Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 125 S. Ct. 1536
(2005).
72. See id., 125 S. Ct. at 1538, interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000).
73. 401 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971).
74. Id. at 433, 91 S. Ct. at 855.
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
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realize that a strict "business necessity" approach would cause the
elimination of many hiring standards that are reasonably predictive
of actual job performance.76 Judges have thus interpreted the
"business necessity" standard to be satisfied if employers can
actually demonstrate "business convenience." It is thus quite
difficult for persons challenging facially neutral hiring standards to
prevail under the disparate impact construct, so long as the factors
in question are meaningfully predictive of job performance-even
if the actual correlation coefficient is relatively modest.
III. NEED FOR MORE EQUITABLE BALANCING OF EMPLOYER AND
EMPLOYEE PRIVACY INTERESTS
It should be apparent that employers often cite privacy interests
to restrict employee and non-employee organizer rights. They
understandably limit union organizing by employees to non-work
time to ensure maximum productivity. So long as they do not
discriminate in this regard by allowing employees to solicit and
distribute literature on behalf of other non-labor organizations
during their work time, these limitations seem reasonable.
The denial to non-employee organizers of access to company
premises also seems appropriate where no outside persons are
given such access. On the other hand, when members of the
general public are invited onto firm premises by retail
establishments, it seems unfair to deny non-employee organizers
access to these open areas. The Labor Board's Jean Country
balancing test which was rejected by the Supreme Court in
Lechmere constituted an appropriate way to balance employer
privacy interests against the statutorily protected right of
organizers to communicate with store employees. In most cases,
access would be limited to public parking lots. Non-employee
organizers would not be allowed to enter the store premises to
enable firms to limit non-business activities in selling areas.
The one area in which Labor Board and court decisions have
reasonably sought to balance employer and worker interests
concerns access by representative unions to company information
needed to negotiate new agreements and to administer existing
contracts. Employers must generally comply with union requests
for relevant information. When highly sensitive data are involved,
employers may require labor officials to execute confidentiality
pledges. When confidential employee information is being sought,
union leaders may be required to obtain the consent of individual
76. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 701 (2006).
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workers before they can obtain access to their personal
information.
When employers decide to monitor the work and personal
activities of employees while they are on firm premises, managers
tend to discount the privacy interest of their workers. Companies
think that they can visually or electronically observe every aspect
of each worker's day. The use of closed-circuit cameras is not
especially intrusive, so long as two requirements are satisfied.
First, the cameras should only focus on work areas and public
areas in which workers have no reasonable expectation of privacy.
They should not be permitted in lavatories, locker rooms, or
similar areas in which employee privacy interests are
paramount-except where employers can demonstrate
extraordinary reasons for such intrusions. Second, companies
should be required to notify employees of the specific areas being
monitored and to clearly indicate the types of conduct that will not
be tolerated.
Telephone, e-mail, and Internet monitoring present more
complex privacy issues. On the one hand, firms want to be sure
employees are performing their assigned job tasks during work
hours, and they wish to preclude worker use of these media for
improper purposes such as the harassment of coworkers, access to
pornographic sites, or the disclosure of confidential corporate
information. On the other hand, workers who are permitted to use
these communication channels for personal reasons have the right
to expect their appropriate exchanges with coworkers and outside
persons will remain confidential. How can companies
simultaneously honor these seemingly contradictory firm and
employee interests? They should initially notify employees that
their phone calls, e-mail exchanges, and Internet activities are
subject to firm monitoring. They should also have appropriate use
policies indicating the specific activities that will not be tolerated.
To minimize the obvious infringement of employee privacy,
companies should assign designated persons to perform these
monitoring functions, and these individuals should be forbidden to
disclose the information they obtain except to proper company
officials. Finally, they should only be permitted to apprise firm
managers of actions which contravene the appropriate use
guidelines. All other information they intercept should remain
confidential.
In the relatively few employment environments in which
unions represent the employees involved, employers are obliged to
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negotiate worker monitoring practices. 77 Should they fail to do so,
unfair labor practice liability would result.78 In many cases, labor
and management officials should be able to achieve mutual
accommodations of their competing interests. If union negotiators
do not acquiesce to company demands in this area, however, this
would not prevent the establishment of monitoring policies. Once
firm officials negotiate in good faith over these issues and reach
bargaining impasses, they would have the right to unilateralI
implement the monitoring policies they offered to union officials.
For the ninety percent of private sector workers no longer
represented by labor organizations, they would have no meaningful
way to influence corporate monitoring practices. They would have
to hope that corporate leaders acted responsibly in this important
area. If not, they would have to exercise the "exit voice" and look
for work elsewhere.
What would motivate corporate leaders to adopt the types of
monitoring policies that would appropriately respect employee
privacy interests-the realization that if they fail to do so and
employees become dissatisfied with more intrusive firm
monitoring, workers will implore Congress and state legislatures to
enact laws protecting worker privacy rights. Individual firms now
possess the capacity to formulate appropriate use and monitoring
policies tailored to their particular needs and interests. Legislative
bodies, on the other hand, tend to enact expansive statutes that
apply equally to all covered entities. If corporations do not do the
right thing voluntarily, there is a good chance they will have
legislative regulations imposed upon them which will be far more
restrictive than the limitations they should have devised on their
own to avoid the unnecessary dilution of employee privacy rights.
77. See Colgate-Palmolive Co., 323 N.L.R.B. 515 (1997). They also have
to negotiate over mandatory drug testing (Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B.
180 (1989)), but not over drug testing of job applicants (Star Tribune, 295
N.L.R.B. 543 (1989)). See generally Marion Crain, Expanded Employee Drug-
Detection Programs and the Public Good: Big Brother at the Bargaining Table,
64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1286 (1989).
78. See Brewers & Maltsters, Local Union 6 v. NLRB, 414 F.3d 36 (D.C.
Cir. 2005).
79. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 82 S. Ct. 1107 (1962).
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